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ARTICLE 134, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUSTICE-A STUDY IN VAGUENESS
ROBINSON 0. EVERETT'*
Congress, when the Uniform Code of Military Justice was adopted,'
sought to assure that every serviceman be apprised of the obligations
imposed by the Code. Therefore, it provided that many of the articles
of the Uniform Code "be carefully explained to every enlisted person"
soon after his entrance on active duty, and that thereafter copies of the
Code and of the Manual for Courts-Martial be made available for his
"personal examination."' 2 However, there is one article of the Code-
article 134 3-which would seem in many ways to defy explanation, and
whose true meaning might baffle the examination of the most skilled
lawyer. With awesome generality, it provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons
subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance of
by a general, special, or summary court-martial, according to the
nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the
discretion of that court.
Article 134, sometimes called the "General Article,"' 4 and its com-
panion, article 133, 5 which proscribes conduct unbecoming an officer and
gentleman, have ancient antecedents. The former "has been a part of
our military law since 1775, and directly traces its origin to British
sources." 6 Both the Articles of War and the Articles for the Government
of the Navy contained similar sweeping prohibitions. And, despite
objections that it was vague, the General Article has withstood consti-
tutional attack.
7
* Former Commissioner, United States Court of Military Appeals; Visiting
Associate Professor Duke Law School; Author, "Military Justice in the Armed
Forces of the United States."
'-Act of May 5, 1950, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940. In 1956 the Uniform Code was
recodified as part of the revision of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
210 U.S.C. § 937, art. 137 (1956). 810 U.S.C. § 934, art. 134 (1956).
'See United States v. Herndon, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 461, 464, 4 C.M.R. 53, 56 (1952)
United States v. Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 425, 4 C.M.R. 15, 17 (1952).
'10 U.S.C. § 933, art. 133 (1956).
'United States v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 163, 7 C.M.R. 37, 39 (1953).
For further background on Article 134, see Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of
Rights: The Original Practice I, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1, 11-12. As is pointed out by
Wiener, originally "the general article did not confer a general criminal jurisdiction."
TUnited States v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.I'f.A. 161, 7 C.M.R. 37 (1953). See also
Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696
1881); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858).
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Concerning the provisions of article 134 it has been said that they
"have acquired the core of a settled and understandable content of
meaning."8 It should be interesting to discover whether this observation
is completely accurate and, if so, what constitutes the "core" of meaning.
Furthermore, should some change be made in the current interpretation
and application of article 134?
THE THREE CLAUSES OF ARTICLE 134
Three types of conduct come within article 134: (a) Disorders and
neglects which prejudice good order and discipline in the armed forces;
(b) service-discrediting conduct; and (c) crimes and offenses not capital.
Frequently the same act will fall within two or possibly all categories.
For instance, behavior which transgresses Title 18 of the United States
Code and therefore clearly constitutes a "crime and offense not capital"
may also be prejudicial to good order or service-discrediting. Or perhaps
the same conduct may be both disorderly and service-discrediting. 9
The Manual for Courts-Martial,' 0 in dealing with disorders, seems to
limit the possible realm of criminal liability by stating :
"To the prejudice of good order and discipline" refers only to
acts directly prejudicial to good order and discipline and not to
acts which are prejudicial only in a remote or indirect sense. An
irregular or improper act on the part of a member of the military
service can scarcely be conceived which may not be regarded as in
some indirect or remote sense prejudicing discipline, but the
article does not contemplate such distant effects and is confined to
cases in which the prejudice is reasonably direct and palpable.
However, the moderate approach taken in the Manual has not always
been manifest in the judicial interpretations of article 134.
In an early case the Court of Military Appeals considered the criminal
liability of a marine who was charged with enticing other servicemen
at Camp Lejeune to engage in sexual intercourse with a female.
2 Ap-
parently this conduct was not considered service-discrediting since it
"transpired in the semi-privacy of a military reservation."'
3  Moreover,
the court recognized that simple fornication probably would not violate
' United States v. Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 163, 7 C.M.R. 37, 39 (1953). In
support of this observation, it was noted that "no less than forty-seven offenses
cognizable thereunder" are explicitly included in the Table of Maximum Punish-
ments which is set out in the 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial.
I The Court of Military Appeals once stated: "The 'discredit' and 'disorders and
neglects' categories have been used, we believe, confusingly, and at times inter-
changeably, by the services." See United States v. Herndon, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 461,
464, 4 C.M.IR. 53, 56 (1952). However, some might question the extent to which
the court has eliminated the confusion.
"°MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951. (hereinafter cited
MANUAL.)
1 MANUAL, para. 213a at 381 (1951).
United States v. Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 4 C.M.R. 15 (1952).1 Id. at 425, 4 C.M.R. at 17.
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article 134. Nonetheless, the enticement "clearly evinced to his fellow
Corpsmen a wanton disregard for a moral standard generally and
properly accepted by society" and constituted "a manifest example of
conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline."
14 Exemplify-
ing still further its concept of conduct prejudicing good order, the
court intimated that "drunkenness, use of profane language, wearing
improper uniform, use of indecent language to a female, uncleanliness in
person, and gambling" might constitute disorders if they occurred in
the presence of members of the armed forces. 15
Only a few weeks had passed when, in United States v. Herndon,"0
the court indicated that it might have some reservations concerning its
previous indication that misconduct "in the semi-privacy of a military
reservation" could not be service-discrediting. However, it relied on
the prejudicial-to-good-order clause of article 134 in holding that a navy
lieutenant could be prosecuted for receiving stolen property on a
military reservation. The opinion quotes approvingly Colonel Win-
throp's remark about "disorders and neglects" :17
"In this comprehensive term are included all such insubordina-
tion; disrespectful or insulting language or behaviour towards
superiors or inferiors in rank; violence; immorality; dishonesty;
fraud or falsification; drunken, turbulent, wanton, mutinous, or
irregular conduct; violation of standing orders, regulations, or
instructions; neglect or evasion of official or routine duty, or
failure to fully or properly perform it ;-in fine all such 'sins of
commission or omission,' on the part either of officers or soldiers
as, on the one hand, do not fall within the category of the 'crimes'
previously designated, and, on the other hand, are not expressly
made punishable in any of the other ('foregoing') specific Articles
of the code, while yet being clearly prejudicial to good order and
military discipline."
In concluding that it constituted a disorder for a soldier to accept
money from another enlisted man to transport a Korean female in the
government vehicle which he drove, the Court of Military Appeals
commented: "Any irregular or improper act on the part of a member
of the armed services which directly and substantially affects adversely
the discipline or good order of the service may be made the subject
of a charge."'I s More recently the court has indicated that it considered
that any solicitation to commit a crime would fall within the "disorders
and neglects" clause of article 134.19
14Id. at 427, 4 C.M.R. at 19.15Id. at 426, 4 C.M.R. at 18.
1 U.S.C.M.A. 461, 4 C.M.R. 53 (1952).I71d. at 464, 4 C.M.R. at 56.
8 United States v. Alexander, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 348, 12 C.M.R. 102, 104 (1953).
19United States v. Goodnight, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 542, 26 C.M.R. 322 (1958) ; United
States v. Oakley, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 733, 23 C.M.R. 197 (1957).
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In so far as service-discrediting conduct is concerned, little heed has
been given to the early statements that article 134 "is not intended to set
up a moral standard for the conduct of an individual in private" and that
conduct was probably not service-discrediting if it occurred on a military
reservation.20  For instance, drunkenness in a public place was held
service-discrediting even though the accused wore civilian clothes at the
time and his identity as a member of the military was not obvious to
view.21 It has even been stated that "in the military sphere drunkenness
in the privacy of one's own quarters is a punishable offense."
'22
In United States v. Berry,23 the Court of Military Appeals, though
still declining to rule definitely whether simple fornication could be
punished under article 134, concluded that fornication in the known
presence of a third person is service-discrediting. The evidence showed
that Berry and another soldier named Mitchell, who was tried with him
in a common trial, had picked up two German girls in a Berlin cafe and
then gone with them to a hotel where the two servicemen shared a
room and also shared each girl. Thus, the only third persons who
witnessed the service-discrediting conduct were persons who were en-
gaged in identical conduct, and even with the same participants. Criminal
liability seems here to result from the soldiers' thrift in sharing the same
room instead of fornicating in two adjoining rooms.
A retired rear admiral was recalled to duty to be court-martialed
under article 133 for conduct unbecoming an officer, in that he had
associated with known sexual deviates. The admiral challenged the
sufficiency of the evidence and contended that the element of disgrace
to the services was lacking since the association occurred solely in the
presence of sexual deviates. The Court of Military Appeals noted that
the accused had misconceived the evidence "for the conduct was observed
by Intelligence agents and at least one female was present. '24  More-
over, "assuming the correctness of the defense estimate of the evidence,"
the Berry case demonstrated the fallacy of the defense argument.
One thing especially disturbing about this opinion is its implication
that conduct not otherwise service-discrediting can become service-
discrediting because it is discovered by investigators and, therefore, is no
longer completely private. There are very few parallels for holding
that behavior becomes criminal simply because the policeman is alert
enough to "catch someone in the act."
At the present time there seems to be quite a movement afoot to
eliminate from judicial scrutiny many types of "private" conduct that
"United States v. Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 4 C.M.R. 15 (1952).
"United States v. McMurtry, 1 C.M.R. 715 (1952)." United States v. Lowe, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 654, 658, 16 C.M.R. 228, 232 (1954).
23 6 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 20 C.M.R. 325 (1956).
" United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637, 647, 26 C.M.R. 207, 217 (1958).
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heretofore have been punishable. For instance, in England, where
prostitution, fornication, and adultery committed in private have long
been immune from punishment, it has been recently and authoritatively
proposed-partially as a result of the late Doctor Kinsey's investigations
-that still other types of sexual immorality be exempted from prosecu-
tion.25 In the United States where the American Law Institute has been
formulating a new Model Penal Code there has been considerable senti-
ment in the same direction. 26  On the other hand, in the application
of article 134-and without any mandate from Congress that can be
termed in any way "specific"-the tendency has seemed to be in the
opposite direction.
Yet in one area-that of gambling debts-the Court of Military Ap-
peals has refused to hold that disregard of a "moral obligation" can be
service-discrediting. Apparently any failure to pay a gambling debt,
however discreditable that failure may appear to the average serviceman,
will not fall within article 134.27 Indeed, even the giving of a worthless
check in connection with a gambling transaction cannot be the basis for
a court-martial.
2s '
Where gambling is not involved, it is held that the giving of a bad
check or the failure to pay a debt, if dishonorable and not merely
negligent, is service-discrediting and therefore in violation of article
134.2 The rationale underlying this view has been well-stated, as
follows :80
Moreover, members of the military community-easily identi-
fied through the wearing of the uniform-are inevitably grouped
in the public mind as a class-with the result that a failure by one
to discharge monetary responsibilities tends to brand all not only
as criminal persons, but as poor credit risks as well, in the eyes of
the civilian population. Too, the ancient ethical traditions of
the profession of arms cannot safely be left out of account in this
connection. Historically, of course, these moral customs have
possessed a particularly binding force in the case of commissioned
officers-but they have not at all been rejected in that of enlisted
personnel. And they have always dictated a high standard of
promissory responsibility.
"SReport of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution (1957).
" See 23 Law Week 2606 (May 24, 1955).
" United States v. Lenton, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 690, 25 C.M.R. 194 (1958); United
States v. Walter, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 50, 23 C.M.R. 274 (1957). Also, the exercise of
one's legal rights and privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination,
is not discreditable conduct. United States v. Sinigar, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 330, 20
C.M.1R 46 (1955).
"8 United States v. Young, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 695, 25 C.M.R. 199 (1958); United
States v. Walter, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 50, 23 C.M.R. 274 (1957).
" United States v. Lightfoot, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 686, 23 C.M.R. 150 (1957); United
States v. Downard, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 538, 20 C.M.R. 254 (1955); United States v.
Kirksey, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 556, 20 C.M.R. 272 (1955).
30 United States v. Kirksey, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 556, 559, 20 C.M.R. 272, 275 (1955).
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In support of the criminal liability imposed on the "dishonorabl&'
debtor, it should be noted that since service personnel are very transient
and their pay not subject to garnishment, their sources of credit might
well dry up were not article 134 available as a weapon for the outraged
creditor. So perhaps there is some justification for the military excep-
tion to the usual rules against imprisonment for debt. Unfortunately,
though, as many military lawyers will testify, article 134 is sometimes
used as a lever by overreaching finance companies or sellers to secure
payment of unjust claims. Time and again a serviceman will be terrified
into paying a claim because of a letter from his alleged creditor-often
with a copy to the accused's commander-wherein he is informed that
he is subject to prosecution under article 134. Although the Armed
Services disavow any intent to become a collection agency, and will even
provide the aid of legal assistance officers for service personnel who
deny the existence or validity of a claim, it seems clear that many
servicemen are not willing to take the chance that a court-martial might
find their failure to pay a debt was "dishonorable."3 1
The Manual for Courts-Martial makes clear that "crimes and
offenses not capital" is a phrase that refers only to crimes under federal
law-for the most part Title 18 of the United States Code. Thus,
failure of a finance officer to render his accounts,32 transportation of a
stolen vehicle in interstate commerce,3 3 wiretapping,34 intimidating a
witness in a court of the United States,3 5 or aiding in the overthrow
of the United States Government 6 could, under some circumstances
constitute transgressions of article 134 since they are specifically pro-
hibited by federal statutes other than the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
Except where the Assimilative Crimes Act3 7 is involved-a very
limited situation involving some military reservations and other federal
enclaves-the fact that an act violates a state law does not ipso facto
3' See also EvEREr, MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE ARmEI FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES, at 65-66 (1956).
2United States v. Doyle, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 585, 14 C.M.R. 3 (1954).
" United States v. McCarthy, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 385, 15 C.M.R. 385 (1954).
"United States v. Noce, 5 U.S.C.M1.A. 715, 19 C.M.R. 11 (1955). But wire-
tapping is not an offense if committed overseas since Section 605 of the Communica-
tions Act is not extraterritorial in effect and has no application to a telephone
communication made and completed within the boundaries of a foreign country.
United States v. Gopaulsingh, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 772, 19 C.M.R. 68 (1955). Many
other parts of the Federal Criminal Code would be subject to the same limitation
and therefore the "crimes and offenses not capital" clause in article 134 will have
its chief applicability to conduct in the United States. See also EvERETr, op. cit.
mipra note 31, at 67.
"' United States v. LaSage, 22 C.M.R. 853 (1956); United States v. Long, 2
U.S.C.M.A. 60, 6 C.M.R. 60 (1952).
United States v. Blevens, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 18 C.M.R. 104 (1955).
, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1950). Recently this' act was upheld as constitutional in
United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958), despite an attack on grounds of
improper delegation of federal legislative power.
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make it a violation of article 134.38 Also, although at least one senate
committee seems not to have realized it,39 conduct may transgress the
law of a country where a serviceman is stationed and still not be a
violation of article 134.40 Obviously, though, conduct which is service-
discrediting or prejudicial to good order can also violate state or foreign
laws.
There have been instances in which the fact that the conduct violated
a state statute was specifically alleged in connection with a prosecution
based on article 134, and even where the court-martial was instructed
with reference to the state law.41 It could be argued that the violation
of the state law was ipso facto service-discrediting. However, this
argument would, in practical effect, mean that the "crimes and offenses"
clause of article 134 was not limited to federal crimes.42 Then, if the
violation of the state law is not of itself and automatically service-
discrediting, should it even be alleged?
As a general rule, a prosecuting attorney in civilian practice cannot
allege and prove a crime for which the defendant is not being tried.
Indeed, gratuitously to allege and prove that an accused has committed
some offense with which he was not charged might well constitute
prejudicial error. On this analogy it would seem highly dubious to
allege and prove the violation of state or foreign law when prosecuting
under article 134.
On the other hand, are not statutes-be they state or foreign-a good
embodiment of some of the norms and customs that are prevalent in the
particular jurisdiction? And is not their violation some index of
possible discredit to the American Armed Forces within the area in-
volved? This question in turn poses the still-unanswered problem of
what "discredit" Congress was referring to when it enacted article 134.
American troops are stationed all over the world; in some countries
where they are located behavior such as bigamy, which is not condoned
in the United States, and can be prosecuted under article 134, might be
socially and legally acceptable-and would ii no wise discredit our
Armed Forces. Conversely, conduct that is acceptable in the United
States might transgress the taboos and laws of many foreign countries
where we maintain armed forces. While flexibility may be desirable in
a legal system, it is questionable that Congress intended to delegate the
" MANUAL, para. 213c, at 383 (1951). See also United States v. Grosso, 7
U.S.C.M.A. 566, 23 C.M.R. 30 (1957); United States v. Leach, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 388,
22 C.M.R. 178 (1956); United States v. Thompson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 620, 14 C.M.R.
38 (1954). Is it bribery for purposes of article 134 if a state rather than a federal
official is "bribed." See United States v. Smith, 23 C.M.R. 629 (1957).
"See EvEzYTrT, op. cit. supra note 31, at 66.
"MANUAL, op. cit. supra note 38.
"See United States v. Grosso, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 566, 23 C.M.R. 30 (1957) ; United
States v. Leach, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 388, 22 C.M.R. 178 (1956)."2 EvE mr, op. cit. supra note 31, at 67.
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criminal liability of American service personnel to the varying opinions in
different American states and foreign countries concerning what conduct
is permissible-opinions evidenced by state or foreign laws. This being
so, it would seem desirable for the Court of Military Appeals to hold
outright that usually a violation of state or foreign law will be immaterial
and inadmissible in a prosecution under article 134. Unfortunately no
such explicit holding has been forthcoming.
THE FORM SPECIFICATIONS
The Manual for Courts-Martial sets forth in an appendix approxi-
mately sixty Form Specifications-many with several indicated permissi-
ble variations-which can be used in drafting charges under article 134."3
These Form Specifications correspond roughly to forms used by a drafts-
man in drawing up an indictment or information; usually they tend to be
brief and set forth the bare minimal requirements of the offense,44 with
details available presumably through the pre-trial investigation or a
motion for a bill of particulars. Many of the offenses dealt with in the
Form Specifications are not mentioned anywhere else in the Manual for
Courts-Martial or in the Uniform Code itself.
The fact that these Form Specifications have been promulgated in
the Manual for Courts-Martial, which is itself a presidential executive
order promulgated more or less contemporaneously with the Uniform
Code's enactment,45 would give them great weight in the ascertainment
of the core of meaning in article 134. Of course, some problem might be
presented concerning the delegation to the President of the power to
provide the standards of guilt.46 However, many of the Form Specifica-
tions have been carried forward from Manuals for Courts-Martial which
antedated the Uniform Code and Congress may well have acquiesced
in the interpretation in those earlier Manuals of article 13 4 's predeces-
sors.4 7 Also, the 1951 Manual seems to have been given congressional
attention and presumably Congress' displeasure would have been made
known had it felt that the Form Specifications went beyond the intend-
ment of the general article.48 Under these circumstances, any objection
as to delegation is less convincing.
, Appendix 6, Specifications 118-176. Many Form Specifications have several
possible variations. For instance Form Specification 171 in the Manual entitled
"Threat, communicating" reads: In that - did, (at) (on board) - , on or
about -19-, wrongfully communicate to - a threat to (injure - by -)
(accuse - of haiing committed the offense of -) (-).
" See note 43 supra.
"5 Exec. Order No. 10214, 3 C.F.R., 1949-1953 Comp., p. 3.
" The problem of legislative delegation has recently been considered by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
"T See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, U. S. ARMY, 1949, at 327-333; MANUAL
FOR COURTs-MARTIAL, U. S. ARMY, 1928, at 254-7. Cf. United States v. Kirksey,
6 U.S.C.M.A. 556, 20 C.M.R. 272 (1955).
"' Presumably the requirement in article 36 of the Uniform Code, 10 U.S.C. §
836, that all rules and regulations promulgated by the President "be reported to
the Congress" reflects a legislative desire to keep a close watch on military justice.
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PRE-EMPTION
American judges are by now well familiar with a doctrine of pre-
emption, under which state legislation is frequently invalidated because
it concerns a field that has been pre-empted by federal laws. A somewhat
similar doctrine is applied in military law with respect to article 134's
applicability.
The leading case is United States v. Norris,4" where the Court of
Military Appeals held that a prosecution for the wrongful taking of
property could not be maintained because the area of behavior that
it concerned had been "pre-empted" by another punitive article of the
Uniform Code-article 121, which concerns larceny and wrongful
appropriation. This holding signified that an accused could not be
prosecuted if, by reason of drunkenness or otherwise, he wrongfully took
another's property without having the specific intent required for con-
viction under article 121. Thus, the Armed Forces could not evade the
specific intent requirement of article 121 by resort to the general article.
Subsequent cases plot a rather erratic course. It has been held that:
(a) offenses involving unauthorized absence must be prosecuted within
the restrictions of articles 85, 86, and 87 of the Uniform Code,50 (b)
any larceny from the person must meet the demands of article 122,
dealing with robbery;51 (c) all misbehavior before the enemy must fall
within article 99;52 (d) false swearing in judicial proceedings must
conform to article 131, which proscribes perjury and demands that the
falsity be material.
53
There are several cases which are difficult to reconcile with the
foregoing. For instance, article 129 of the Uniform Code deals with
burglary and article 130 with housebreaking. Both offenses, as defined
there, require a specific intent to commit a criminal offense in the build-
ing entered. However, the Court of Military Appeals has held that under
article 134 a serviceman can be prosecuted for "unlawful entry" when he
enters a building without any intent to commit offense therein-a situa-
tion often posed by proof of extreme intoxication.5 4 Such a holding,
as will appear from the subsequent discussion, is all the more dangerous
since the maximum punishments are, for the most part, not prescribed
by the Congress in the punitive articles.
'92 U.S.C.M.A. 236, 8 C.M.R. 36 (1953)."0 United States v. Deller, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 409, 12 C.M.R. 165 (1953); United
States v. Johnson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 174, 11 C.M.R. 174 (1953).r' United States v. Rios, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 203, 15 C.M.R. 203 (1954).
2 Unitid States v. Hallett, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 378, 15 C.M.R. 378 (1954).
"' United States v. Smith, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 236, 26 C.M.R. 16 (1958). For the
materiality requirement in a different context, see United States v. Dozier, 9
U.S.C.M.A. 443, 26 C.M.R. 223 (1958).
"' United States v. Love, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 260, 15 C.M.R. 260 (1954). However,
the wording of the Form Specification for unlawful entry, together with other
circumstances, persuaded the court that there could be no unlawful entry into an
automobile. United States v. Gillin, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 25 C.M.R. 173 (1958).
[Vol. 37
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Article 117 of the Uniform Code-a section which might itself be
accused of some vagueness-proscribes the use of "provoking or re-
proachful words or gestures" towards any other person subject to the
Uniform Code. Article 127 makes extortion punishable, and defines it
as the use of threats to obtain something of value. For the former of-
fense an accused person can receive confinement for up to 3 months;
for the latter, confinement up to three years. However, it has been held
that, despite the pre-emption precedents, an accused can be tried under
article 134 for "communicating threats" and be punished therefor by up,
to three years' confinement.55 Should not the Court of Military Appeals
have found that articles 117 and 127 had pre-empted the field of speech
offenses and left no scope for article 134. The desirability of such a posi-
tion seems all the greater in light of the relative maximum punishments.
Cheating--even when it involves money-is an offense that has not
been pre-empted by article 121 which includes larceny, embezzlement,
and obtaining property by false pretenses. 6 The fraudulent burning of
the accused's own house with the intent to defraud an insurance com-
pany-behavior which did not constitute arson under the common law
but which has been made punishable by legislation in many states-was
deemed to violate article 134, even though Congress had, in article 126,
enacted a broad arson statute that would cover the burning of another's
property.5" And even though some types of solicitation to commit
offenses, are made specifically punishable under article 82, the Court of
Military Appeals has held that any solicitation to commit a crime is
punishable as a disorder, and permits up to four months' confinement. 5
In most jurisdictions, proof of involuntary manslaughter is held
to require more than simple negligence of the sort that would authorize
a judgment for damages. In adopting article 119 which covers man-
slaughter and requires "culpable negligence" for an involuntary man-
slaughter conviction, Congress also intended something more than simple
negligence. However, it has been held that punishment can be inflicted
under article 134 for "negligent homicide" which requires only simple
negligence. 9 Thus, the field of homicide was not pre-empted by
articles 118 (murder) or 119 (manslaughter).
" United States v. Kelly, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 25 C.M.R. 288 (1958) (instructions
defining "threat"); United States v. Holiday, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 454, 16 C.M.R. 28
(1954). For other cases which hold that certain types of speech can be punishable
under article 134, see United States v. Grosso, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 566, 23 C.M.R. 30
(1957) (defamation); United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 22 C.M.R. 41
(1956) (obscene words uttered over the telephone).
8 United States v. Holt, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 617, 23 C.M.R. 81(1957).
* United States v. Fuller, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 143, 
25 C.M.R. 405 (1958).
58 United States v. Goodnight, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 542, 26 C.M.R. 322 (1958) (solicit-
ing the disobedience of a regulation is only a simple disorder") ; United States v.Oakley, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 733, 23 C.M.R. 197 (1957).
5 'United States v. Kirchner, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 477, 4 C.M.R. 69 (1952). Ci.
United States v. Schultz, 1 U.S.C..A. 512, 4 C.M.R. 104 (1952), where a
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Some of the results can be upheld on the ground that the offense
held punishable under article 134 is specifically proscribed by a Form
Specification in the 1951 Manual for Courts-Martial-and that these
forms embodied in an executive order that was contemporaneous with the
Uniform Code are entitled to great weight. This argument might be
used with respect to the unlawful entry, negligent homicide, and com-
municating threats cases.60 But even this argument does not explain
the result as to the fraudulent burning of one's own house or the
-solicitation to commit a crime other than those specified under article
82 (the very article which is entitled solicitation).
Moreover, if pre-emption is to be applied why not also apply it to
hold that the Manual itself has pre-empted all the offenses under article
134? In other words, if conduct is not specifically prohibited somewhere
in the Manual for Courts-Martial-be it in the Form Specifications or
elsewhere-it would then be held that it could not be considered to the
prejudice of good order or service-discrediting, because that field of
conduct has been pre-empted by the Manual. Of course, this would give
some meaning to the Uniform Code's requirement that a complete text of
the Manual for Courts-Martial should be made available to any person
on active duty for his personal examination,6 ' for he would know that if
his contemplated behavior was criminal it would be specifically re-
ferred to somewhere in the Manual. Admittedly, this would sacrifice
some flexibility in the application of article 134, but any unwarranted
area of immunity could easily be rectified by new legislation or by
amendment of the Manual and acquiescence therein by Congress.
The case law has not, however, developed along these lines. Instead,
time and again allegations have been held legally sufficient on the analogy
of some offense prohibited in the Manual for Courts-Martial. For in-
stance, acceptance of money for transporting a passenger in a govern-
ment vehicle was analogized to graft and bribery, which are dealt with
in the Manual.6 2 So, too, with the acceptance of money for services in
negligent homicide conviction was upheld under the law of war rather than under
article 134.
6 Form Specifications 174, 144, and 171, respectively. In a number of the cases
great weight is given to the wording of the Form Specification or to their absence.
See, e.g., United States v. Gillin, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 25 C.M.R. 173 (1958) (unlaw-
ful entry); United States v. Eagleson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 685, 14 C.M.R. 103 (1954)
(hit and run driving). However, in United States v. Waluski, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 724,
21 C.M.R. 46 (1956)-another hit and run case, where the liability of a passenger
was being considered-the Court of Military Appeals noted: "However the sample
specification is only a procedural guide. By itself it cannot create an offense." In
United States v. Norris, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 236, 8 C.M.R. 36 (1953), the court, in hold-
ing that there was no offense of wrongful taking under article 134, emphasized that
the Manual contained no sample specification for this offense.
6 10 U.S.C. § 937, art. 137 (1956). In at least one recent Supreme Court case,
absence of notice of an ordinance led to reversal of a conviction thereunder.
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957)." United States v. Alexander, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 12 C.M.R. 102 (1953).
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obtaining a passY3 A recent opinion notes that the accused was con-
victed of "indecent assault upon a married woman, in violation of article
134." 64 One can find "indecent assaults" in the Manual; but there seems
to be no reference therein to such an attack "upon a married woman." 65
Is this still another new crime?
In illustrating the conduct which is unbecoming an officer and gentle-
man and therefore violates article 133, the Manual mentions "public asso-
ciation with notorious prostitutes."6 6l Admiral Hooper was prosecuted
under this article for publicly associating with "persons known to be
sexual deviates, to the disgrace of the armed forces." The Court of
Military Appeals held that this charge was permissible on the analogy
to association with notorious prostitutes.67 As for notoriety, this was
deemed to be covered by the allegations "known to be sexual deviates"
and "to the disgrace of the armed forces." One must question the
desirability of upholding such a prosecution by analogy without more
specific authorization from either the Code or the Manual.
The Manual contains a Form Specification under article 134 which is
entitled "gambling with subordinate,"68 and apparently embodies the
view that a superior and subordinate should not compromise their
respective ranks by gambling together. The old maxim expressio unius,
exclusio alterius would indicate that gambling per se was not illegal, and
that for two persons of equal rank to gamble does not transgress article
134. However, the Court of Military Appeals, which has inveighed
against gambling, does not seem to share this view.6 9
In military law the use of the pre-emption doctrine as to article 134
has been a healthy development. Without it the Armed Services would
be almost completely free to evade the requirements of other punitive
articles of the Uniform Code. Suppose that X plus Y constitute a viola-
tion of some article of the Code. Without pre-emption, it could be
contended that X alone was service-discrediting conduct. Since the
President sets the maximum punishments---except for capital offenses-
he could then, by executive order, authorize a maximum punishment for
X that would be the same as for X plus Y. Absent pre-emption, the
"'United States v. Bey, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 665, 16 C.M.R. 239 (1954).
,United States v. Bugros, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 276, 26 C.M.R. 56 (1958).
MANUAL, Form Specification 120, at 488 (1951). Apparently, the Court of
Military Appeals is willing to hold that an unmarried serviceman violates article
134 by marrying a woman who has a husband, even though the accused does not
meet the usual bigamy requirement, stated in Form Specification 126 of the Manual,
that the bigamist have a living spouse. United States v. Wille, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 623,
26 C.M.R. 403 (1958).
"MANUAL, para. 212, at 301 (1951).
' United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 207 (1958).
"MANUAL, Form Specification 143, at 491.
,United States v. Walter, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 50, 23 C.M.R. 274 (1957).
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overt act requirement could be eliminated from conspiracy; the intent
requirement could be removed from larceny; and so forth.70
Unfortunately pre-emption has been rejected in several instances
where its application would have been both desirable and consistent.
Moreover, the Court of Military Appeals should have applied pre-
emption with respect to the Manual for Courts-Martial and held that an
offense not covered specifically in the Manual could not be the basis for
a prosecution under article 134.
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE OFFENSE
In civil courts, the judge instructs the jury on the elements of the
offense that must be found beyond a reasonable doubt in order to con-
vict. Similarly, under the Uniform Code, the law officer-a well quali-
fied attorney who sits apart from the members of the court-martial-
instructs them on the elements of the offenses charged and on any other
legal issues concerning the findings or the sentence.
Under the most recent decisions of the Court of Military Appeals,
the members of the court-martial will be the ultimate arbiters of what is
service-discrediting or prejudical to good order. It has been held that,
under penalty of reversal of a conviction, the law officer must specifically
instruct in an article 134 prosecution-other than for a "crime and of-
fense not capital'"-that, in order to convict, the court members must find
that the behavior alleged and proved did either prejudice good order and
discipline or discredit the Armed Forces. For instance, a conviction of
assault on an air policeman in the execution of his duties was reversed
for failure to give such an instruction.71
In some instances it might be appropriate for this matter to be sub-
mitted to the members of the court-martial. However, it seems that
generally, as a matter of law, the violation of the standards of article 134
would be almost self-evident. Who could seriously contend that it did
-not prejudice good order to assault an air policeman in the performance
of his duties? Or that it was not service-discrediting to assault a
woman with the intent to commit rape ?72 Since both types of behavior
are specifically prohibited by the Manual, it is all the more difficult to
conceive of their ever falling outside of article 134?s scope.
A court-martial which did acquit even though convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the assaults had taken place would have perpetrated
a monumental miscarriage of justice. Why then provide the occasion for
" This was pointed out by Chief Judge Quinn in United States v. Norris, 2
U.S.C.M.A. 236, 8 C.M.R. 36 (1953). See also United States v. Rios, 4 U.S.C.M.A.
203, 15 C.M.R. 203 (1954)." United States v. Gittens, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 673, 25 C.M.R. 177 (1958). Ch
United States v. Williams, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 325, 24 C.M.R. 135 (1957) (narcotics
offense)."2 See United States v. Grimes, 9 U.S.C.MV.A. 272, 26 C.M.R. 52 (1958).
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any such miscarriage-and, at the same time, furnish a new source of
reversible error. just as some conduct has been held to present a
"clear and present danger" as a matter of law78 -ascertainable by the
judge-some conduct should be deemed service-discrediting or prej-
udicial to good order as a matter of law-ascertainable by the law
officer.
Perhaps the submission to the court members in all cases of the
question whether the conduct prejudices good order or discredits the
services constitutes a safety valve against the judicial tendency to extend
the scope of article 134. But it would seem more desirable-and more
productive of uniformity-to place further legal limitations on the scope
of article 134, instead of leaving the matter to the trier of fact.
It is arguable that some borderline cases should be submitted to the
court-martial members-the triers of fact-for a determination whether
the acts alleged and proved meet the basic demands of article 134. And,
if some should be submitted, then-as a matter of administrative con-
venience and simplicity-it may be just as well to require submission in
every case. This seems the only basis on which to justify the instruc-
tional rule presently in vogue, and this certainly is not the foundation on
which that rule has rested.
MENS REA
Some writers on criminal law have urged that criminal responsibility
should generally be limited to intentional conduct and never predicated
on simple negligence. Certainly civilian decisions reflect no uniformity
in this regard.74 Nor do the interpretations of article 134.
Thus, more than negligence is required to sustain a conviction for
failure to pay a debt or for giving a bad check.75 Possession of narcotics
by reason of a negligent mistake is not punishable.7 6 Nor is a negligent
indecent exposure.7 On the other hand, simple negligence will sustain
a conviction for negligent homicide;78 in a bigamy prosecution an un-
reasonable mistake which leads to remarriage will justify conviction.
79
Careless discharge of a firearm or unlawful entry would also probably
not require more than negligence. s0
In some instances, to permit punishment under article 134 for con-
" Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
" See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) for an excellent dis-
cussion of ineirs rea.
11 United States v. Connell, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 228, 22 C.M.R. 18 (1956); United
States v. Downard, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 538, 20 C.M.R. 554 (1955); United States v.
Kirksey, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 556, 20 C.M.R. 272 (1955).
See United States v. Greenwood, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 209, 19 C.M.R. 335 (1955).
"United States v. Manos, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 734, 26 C.M.R. 238 (1958).
, See United States v Kirchner, 1 'U.S.C.M.A. 477, 4 C.M.R. 69 (1952).
" United States v. Bateman, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 88, 23 C.M.R. 312 (1957).
"See Form Specifications 140 and 174. Cf. United States v. Simmons, 1
U.S.C.M.A. 691, 5 C.M.R. 119 (1952).
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duct that is only negligent would seem questionable. This point has
already been made with respect to negligent homicide-where pre-emp-
tion came into play. Congress clearly did not consider that mere neglect
was automatically non-punishable.81 And article 134 itself speaks of
"disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline."
Therefore, because of the close connection between conduct prejudicing
good order, on the one hand, and service-discrediting conduct, on the
other, probably it would be inappropriate to hold that negligence could
suffice for the former and not the latter. And clearly, the Court of
Military Appeals shows no sign of taking any such position.
PUNISHMENT
Article 134, like most of the other punitive articles of the Uniform
Code-but unlike most civilian penal legislation-does not state the
maximum punishments imposable for violations. Thus, except for
capital punishment,8 2 and subject to the statutory prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment,8 3 a court-martial would appear free under this
article to impose any penalty it saw fit. In fact, however, this is not at
all the case, since the President, in the Manual for Courts-Martial and in
subsequent amendatory executive orders, has stated in detail the maxi-
mum punishments authorized for various offenses.8 4  Of course, these
limitations, when applicable, are binding on courts-martial.
This system for setting the maximum punishments raises several
problems. For one thing, has Congress improperly delegated to the
President a legislative function of prescribing the punishment for crimes?
There would certainly be some authority to that effect ;85 but, in light
of the long-continued military practice in this regard and the required
submission to Congress of the regulations on military justice promulgated
by the President, it can be argued that Congress has always retained
"For instance, a negligent failure to obey an order or regulation would seem
to fall within the wording of article 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892. Article 99, 10 U.S.C. §
899, punishes for misbehavior before the enemy one who through "neglect"
endangers the safety of a unit that is in the presence of the enemy. A negligent
loss or destruction of military property of the United States falls within article
108, 10 U.S.C. § 908. A sentinel who falls asleep on post would apparently be
punishable irrespective of the cause therefor so long as it was physically possible for
him to stay awake. See article 113, 10 U.S.C. § 913.
2 For certain specified offenses capital punishment is authorized by the Uniform
Code, but in the absence of such authorization the maximum punishment could
include confinement up to life imprisonment-at least within the limits set by the
President.
8 10 U.S.C. § 855, art. 55. United States v. Wappler, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 393, 9
C.M.R. 23 (1953).
",10 U.S.C. § 856, art. 56, states expressly: "The punishment which a court-
martial may direct for an offense shall not exceed such limits as the President may
prescribe for that offense." For the Table of Maximum Punishments see pages
219-227 of the Manual. Sometimes', during periods of emergency or otherwise,
the maximum punishment is changed by the President, or removed entirely.
88 Cf. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) ; People v.
Grant, 242 App. Div. 310, 275 N.Y. Supp. 74 (3d Dep't 1934).
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control.8 6 Besides, the courts have often placed military justice in a
special niche and refused to apply thereto the principles that might
apply to other areas of criminal law administration.8 7
Secondly, the Manual itself creates uncertainty by its provision that
the maximum limits of punishment which it provides are "not binding
upon courts sentencing officers, warrant officers, aviation cadets, cadets,
midshipmen, and civilians subject to military law."88  Taken literally,
this statement might create improper vagueness as to punishment; but
a court might well take the position that, to avoid vagueness and a pos-
sible discriminatory application of the law, it should invalidate the
purported exclusion of certain categories of persons from the benefits of
the Manual's limitations on maximum punishments.89
However, with respect to some -offenses under article 134, additional
hurdles still remain. Since some conduct which has been held to violate
article 134 is not mentioned explicitly anywhere in the Code or the
Manual, it follows that the maximum punishment for such conduct may
be somewhat vague. Of course, if the offense falls within the article's
clause covering "crimes and offenses not capital," a maximum penalty
can be easily determined by looking at Title 18 of the United States
Code, or whatever other portion of the federal statutes the conduct may
violate.
In other instances, the Manual for Courts-Martial provides the fol-
lowing formula for ascertaining the maximum punishment 50
"127c. Maximum punishments,--The punishment stated op-
posite each offense listed in the Table of Maximum Punishments
is hereby prescribed as the maximum punishment for that offense,
and for any lesser included offense if the latter is not listed, and
for any offense closely related to either if not listed. If an offense
not listed in the table is included in an offense which is listed and
is also closely related to some other listed offense, the lesser pun-
ishment prescribed for either the included or closely related offense
will prevail as the maximum limit of punishment.
"Offenses not listed in the table, and not included within an
8 Cf. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958).
8 For views concerning the proper judicial review of Courts-martial see Dynes
v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858) ; Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
8 MANUAL, para. 127a. at 213 (1951).
" It might be possible to argue that officers should be subject to more severe
penalties than enlisted men, since the former are in a special position of trust.
On this basis, one could justify not giving them the benefit of the President's
limitations on maximum punishments. However, there is no reason to hold that
"civilians subject to military law" should be subject to a higher punishment than
a man in uniform. Indeed, this provision seems to make an unreasonable dis-
crimination; and, in addition, it spawns undesirable vagueness. It would seem
proper to hold that any limitation of punishment stated by the President is
applicable to all persons subject to military law, except perhaps for special geo-
graphical differentiation to permit higher penalties to be imposed for offenses in
danger or combat areas.
"0 MANUAL, para. 127c. at 214 (1951).
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offense listed, or not closely related to either, remain punishable
as authorized by the United States Code (see, generally, Title 18)
or the Code of the District of Columbia, whichever prescribed
punishment is the lesser, or as authorized by the custom of the
service. With respect to other matters which properly may be
considered in fixing punishment, see 76a, 123, and 154a."
A few cases will display the operation of this formula. The maximum
punishment for persons accused of accepting money to transport someone
in a government vehicle or to get liberty passes for trainees was de-
termined upon a supposed analogy to bribery and graft, for which
offenses the Manual specifically authorizes three years' confinement.9 '
Enticement of others to engage in sexual intercourse with prostitutes was
analogized to pandering--which authorizes five years' confinement-even
though some elements of pandering were absent. 92 In United States v.
Blevens, 93 which concerned an accused who had twice deserted to East
Germany and co-operated with the Communists there, the court ruled
that the conduct was service-discrediting and the punishment should be
determined by analogy to a Smith Act violation-even though the Gov-
ernment had apparently failed to allege and prove all the elements re-
quired in a Smith Act prosecution.
In some cases a suggested analogy to a major offense has been re-
jected. For instance, although solicitation to commit any crime consti-
tutes an offense, the Court of Military Appeals ruled that it could not
be analogized for punishment purposes to the solicitation to desert or
commit mutiny, which are the subject of article 82 and permit up to
three years' confinement. Instead it could only be punished as a "simple
disorder," subject to a maximum punishment of four months' confinement
and forfeiture of two-thirds pay for a like period.94 A similar result
was reached where the prosecution concerned the unauthorized possession
of a false pass, but the Government pressed for the application of an
analogy to the punishment of three years' confinement authorized for
possession of a false pass with an intent to deceive. 5
One Cramer was found guilty of wrongfully and dishonorably defiling
the flag of the United States. However, the Court of Military Appeals
" United States v. Bey, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 665, 16 C.M.R. 239 (1954); United
States v. Alexander, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 12 C.M.R. 102 (1953).
92United States v. Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 4 C.M.R. 15 (1952).
5 U.S.C.M.A. 480, 18 C.M.R. 104 (1955). Compare United States v. Long,
2 U.S.C.M.A. 60, 6 C.M.R. 60 (1952) (analogy to federal statutes concerning
obstruction of justice) ; United States v. Messenger, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 21, 6 C.M.R.
21 (1952) (impersonation of officer) ; United States v. Hogsett, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 681,
25 C.M.R. 185 (1958) (postal offense).
" United States v. Goodnight, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 542, 26 C.M.R. 322 (1958) ; United
States v. Oakley, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 733, 23 C.M.R. 197 (1957). But cf. United
States v. Charles, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 424, 26 C.M.R. 204 (1958).
"United States v. Blue, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 550, 13 C.M.R. 106 (1953).
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rejected the assimilation of this conduct for punishment purposes to the
utterance of disloyal statements, with three years' authorized confinement,
and instead held that the maximum penalty was the thirty days con-
finement and $100 fine authorized by U.S.C. 3 for defiling the flag.96
In United States v. Melville,9 7 it was ruled that wrongful cohabitation
is only a "simple disorder" punishable by four months' confinement and
forfeiture of pay, and could not be analogized for punishment purposes to
adultery-which, unlike wrongful cohabitation, requires proof of sexual
intercourse and that one of the parties was married at the time of the
offense.
The District of Columbia Code has been utilized in determining
punishment in several cases. In one, the offense involved was the
solicitation of a prospective witness wrongfully to refuse to testify, for
which fifteen years' confinement is authorized under the United States
Code but only three years under the District of Columbia Code.98  In
accord with the previously quoted paragraph 127c of the Manual for
Courts-Martial, the three year maximum was applied.
In United States v. Mards, 9 "the accused was convicted of wrong-
fully keeping a disorderly house, in violation of article 134." Such an
offense is not adverted to anywhere in the Manual for Courts-Martial;
but the Court of Military Appeals considered that nonetheless it con-
stituted conduct which transgressed article 134. Even though the offense
occurred in Texas, the opinion of the court turns to the District of
Columbia Code to determine both the maximum punishment and the
elements of the offense.
Consideration of these and other cases concerning the maximum
penalties for article 134 violations might well produce resort to a Ouija
board to predict the outcome of future litigation. Although the use of
legal analogy is well-known both in Anglo-American and European law,
the determination of maximum punishments by analogy from penalties
specified in an executive order is a highly unusual phenomenon. What
one confronts in some of these article 134 cases is really a double delega-
tion-delegation from Congress to the President of the power to set
maximum punishments for crime, and from the President to military
tribunals of the power to fill in by analogy any gaps that he may have left
in the penal framework.
VAGUENESS
Many of the problems of vagueness under article 134 stem from the
widespread use of analogy to which military justice now seems com-
"' United States v. Cramer, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 221, 24 C.M.R. 31 (1957).
978 U.S.C.M.A. 597, 25 C.M.R. 101 (1958).
"United States v. Wysong, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 249, 26 C.M.R. 29 (1958).
"6 U.S.C.M.A. 624, 20 C.M.R. 340 (1956).
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mitted.100 Actually this use challenges one premise on which article
134 has been sustained against constitutional attack-namely, that its
meaning has been solidified by long years of military tradition.
If prosecutions under article 134 and the penalties inflicted there-
under were limited by the specific provisions of the Manual for Courts-
Martial, the results might be supportable. Since the Manual is made
readily available to every serviceman, he has very adequate notice of its
contents-indeed, far more adequate notice than that which a citizen
receives concerning the provisions of many statutes. 101  Objections
about an alleged delegation of legislative power to the President could be
countered by showing that the Manual has received some type of con-
gressional ratification, or at least has been acquiesced in by Congress.
Any gaps in the Manual's listing of offenses and punishments could
be rectified by Congress through legislation or by the President through
an amending executive order. And these would operate only prospec-
tively-and not retroactively like some of the "analogies" involved in
interpreting article 134. Other situations could be coped with by the
promulgation of military orders, the disobedience of which would itself be
punishable so long as the order related to a proper military purpose.
10 2
For instance, if a serviceman's operation of a bawdy-house proved serv-
ice-discrediting or prejudicial to good order, he could be ordered
to desist from such conduct-and, if he disobeyed, he could then be
punished for the disobedience.
..0 There are some subsidiary problems of vagueness that have been created
by some of the precedents under article 134. For instance, in United States v.
Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637, 26 C.M.R. 207 (1958) (supra text at notes 24 and 67),
where the accused was prosecuted for association with persons "known to be sexual
deviates," the question is posed: "Known" to whom? Cf. Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 (1939). In prosecutions under article 134 for offenses such as
"indecent acts," or "indecent liberties," difficulty with vagueness can be present.
In Louisiana, the term "indecent assault" in a statute has been held unconstitutionally
vague. State v. Comeaux, 131 La. 930, 60 So. 620 (1913). For representative
military precedents in connection with similar offenses, see United States v. Wil-
liams, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 55, 25 C.M.R. 317 (1958); United States v. Klutz, 9
U.S.C.M.A. 20, 25 C.M.R. 282 (1958); United States v. Nastro, 7 U.S.C.M.A.
373, 22 C.M.R. 163 (1956) ; United States v. Brown 3 U.S.C.M.A. 454, 13 C.M.R.
10 (1953) ; United States v. Burden, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 10 C.M.R. 45 (1953). The
MVanual for Courts Martial in Form Specification 150 deals with loaning money
at "an usurious and unconscionable rate of interest" but never purports to set a
maximum rate of interest. Is this sufficiently definite?
... As has already been noted, the courts are beginning to place more emphasis
on the need for the defendant to have some reasonable notice of the law he is
charged with violating. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). In this
same connection one is reminded of the Supreme Court's words in defending a
Naval predecessor of article 134 against a charge of vagueness: "Notwithstanding
the apparent indeterminateness of such a provision, it is not liable to abuse; for
what those crimes are, and how they are to be punished, is well known by practical
men in the navy and army, and by those who have studied the law of courts-martial,
and the offenses of which the different courts-martial have cognizence." Dynes v.
Hoover, 61 U.S. 65 (1858). Query whether this observation applies fully today to
article 134.
10 10 U.S.C. § 892, art. 92. See also EVmErr, op. cit. supra note 31 at 49-50.
Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 515 (1958).
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CONCLUSIONS
As one writer has recently pointed out, article 134's predecessors
became more and more inclusive over the years. 0 3 The same process
has continued under the Uniform Code. The result has been the spawn-
ing of new and undesirable vagueness in a statute which was already on
the constitutional borderline.
The drastic remedy would be a decision that article 134 is un-
constitutional by reason of vagueness and delegation of legislative power.
More desirable, however, would be a holding that article 134s scope
went no further than the express provisions of the Manual for Courts-
Martial, and that the technique of analogy could not be used either to
determine what constitutes an offense, or what will be the maximum
penalty therefor.
The application of the pre-emption doctrine should be made more
consistent. The significance of the violation of state or foreign law in
an article 134 prosecution should be reconsidered. Also, present legal
requirements should be revised concerning the submission to court-
martial members of the issue whether the accused's conduct prejudiced
good order or was service-discrediting; sometimes these requirements are
nothing more than pitfalls for the unwary law officer.
With some reform, the good features of article 134 can probably be
preserved. Without such reform this article will probably someday
be stricken as unconstitutional-and at the very least will lead to a
continuing mistrust of military justice on the part of the civilian bar and
the public generally.
.o Wiener, supra note 6.
